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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

Hayes v. Whitman, 264 F.3d 1017 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding the district
court correctly granted the Environmental Protection Agency's motion
for summary judgment because the constructive submission theory did
not apply, citizens lacked viable claims under the Administrative
Procedure Act, citizens' motion to amend was untimely, and citizens'
denied affidavit covered waived issues).
Individuals who used Oklahoma's waters and groups that
advocated protecting water quality in Oklahoma ("Citizens") sued the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").
Citizens alleged
Oklahoma failed to develop total maximum daily loads ("TMDLs") for
the state's impaired waters, which constituted a constructive submittal
of no TMDLs and triggered EPA's mandatory duty under the Clean
Water Act to develop these TMDLs. The United States District Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma granted the EPA's motion for
summary judgment, and denied the Citizens' motion to amend.
Citizens appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, which affirmed the district court's decision.
Citizens raised four issues on review. First, Citizens claimed the
district court erred when they granted summary judgment on their
constructive submission claim. The court reviewed constructive
submission and explained the theory turned on whether the state
determined not to submit a required TMDL to the EPA. The state's
decision did not trigger EPA's non-discretionary duty to develop
TMDLs itself unless the state's inaction clearly and unambiguously
demonstrated their decision not to submit required TMDLs. If a state
submitted a TMDL or planned to submit a TMDL in the future, then
constructive submission analysis was factually inapplicable. The court
explained summary judgment was appropriate because Oklahoma
submitted TMDLs to the EPA, thus rendering the constructive
submission theory inapplicable and destroying Citizens' suit based on
EPA's non-discretionary duty.
Second, Citizens asserted the district court erroneously dismissed
three Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") claims. The court
disagreed and affirmed summary judgment on all claims. Citizens had
premised their first APA claim on the constructive submission theory
and EPA's non-discretionary duty. Because Citizens' constructive
submission theory failed, the court affirmed summary judgment on
this issue. Further, Citizens asserted the district court should have
allowed Citizens to challenge the adequacy of Oklahoma's TMDLs
under the APA. The court affirmed summary judgment on this issue
because citizens failed to assert this claim before they submitted their
response to the EPA's motion to dismiss. The court said they
sometimes consider additional facts or legal theories asserted in a
response brief to a motion to dismiss, yet they do not consider
allegations and theories inconsistent with those pleaded in the
complaint. Thus, because Citizens' pleaded that Oklahoma failed to
submit TMDLs, they could not also challenge, in their response to the
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motion to dismiss, EPA's approval of Oklahoma's TMDLs.
Furthermore, the court disagreed with the assertion that Citizens
lacked the knowledge necessary to fully plead this APA claim. In so
holding, it noted that because EPA's actions regarding Oklahoma's
TMDLs were a matter of public record and part of EPA's motion to
dismiss.
Third, Citizens challenged the district court's denial of a motion to
amend their complaint. The court said the district court did not abuse
its discretion in so doing. The court explained, saying untimeliness
alone was a sufficient reason to deny leave to amend. Citizen's request
to amend was untimely because they knew EPA approved some of
Oklahoma TMDLs in April 1998, and did not file their application for
leave to amend until February 2000.
Finally, Citizens asserted the district court erred when they struck
Citizens' affidavit from a TMDL expert. The court affirmed the
district court's decision because the expert's opinion regarded the
substantive inadequacy of Oklahoma's TMDLs. Thus, the affidavit
exceeded the scope of legal issues and was consequently waived, unless
The court held justice
the ends of justice dictated otherwise.
of the waiver and
informed
were
supported the waiver because Citizens
court's grant of
district
the
affirmed
chose to proceed. Thus, the court
summary judgment on all issues.
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FEDERAL CLAIMS COURT
Brace v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 649 (2002) (Denying summary
judgment because genuine issues of material facts existed as to: (1)
whether or not a sufficient nexus existed between plaintiffs land and
interstate water; and (2) the size of the "parcel as a whole" for
purposes of the Penn Centraltest).
Plaintiff, Robert Brace, brought suit against the federal
government ("United States") in the United States Court of Federal
Claims, alleging that the United States took his land without just
compensation when he was ordered to cease operation of a drainage
system located on his property, and to restore parts of his land to its
prior condition, which resembled wetlands. Brace argued that because
the Clean Water Act ("CWA") did not apply until 1977, the United
State's action interfered with the reasonable, investment-backed
expectations he had when he bought the property in 1975.
This case concerned the United States' second motion for
summary judgment. The court denied the first motion because the
court did not have the information it needed to determine the
economic impact, if any, on Brace. In its denial of the United States'
first motion for summary judgment, the court ruled that Brace failed
to meet factors (1) and (3) of the three factors used to determine

